Why Would Berlin Mischaracterize Rousseau?
By Sean McGuire (Portland State University)
Abstract: Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” introduced the terminology of negative and positive
liberty in 1958. Berlin asserts that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s political philosophy (particularly “On the Social
Contract’) exemplifies the dangerous notion of positive liberty. I argue that Berlin’s presentation distorts
Rousseau’s work and overlooks resources that exculpate Rousseau with regard to despotic regimes.
Berlin’s interpretation and portrayal of Rousseau are examined. Berlin’s claims are examined mainly in
light of Rousseau’s “Third Discourse” (The Discourse on Political Economy), as opposed to Berlin’s
emphasis on “The Social Contract”. This work contains Rousseau’s normative commentary on the
principles of good government. The adequacy of Berlin’s positive/negative liberty framework is tested with
respect to Rousseau’s own claims. The topic of this essay is the treatment, and possible mistreatment, of
Rousseau’s political philosophy by Isaiah Berlin. The paper being discussed is Berlin’s “Two Concepts of
Liberty”. The two main faults that I notice in Berlin’s presentation are his suggestions that Rousseau’s work
could possibly legitimize a despotism blind to violations of negative liberty and that Rousseau, being a
main figure discussed in the tradition of positive liberty, is responsible not only for the propagation of
increasingly dangerous ideologies but also atrocities done for their sake.
Positive and Negative Liberty
Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” is an examination of how political philosophers have understood the
concept of freedom or liberty (Berlin uses these terms interchangeably). This topic is worthy of
consideration because freedom has been a foundational aspect of political philosophy. Berlin’s view is that
political philosophy animates men in their deeds; freedom is one of the primary things they seek.
Unfortunately, the different conceptions of liberty that individuals hold lead to conflict (sometimes
violent) among them. Negative and positive freedom are discussed as the two dominant strains in political
theory with regard to the definition of freedom and as the opposing sides in “the open war that is being
fought between two systems of ideas”.93
The first notion of freedom Berlin discusses is negative liberty. This notion of freedom concerns the
interference that individuals encounter from other individuals in pursuit of their objectives or purposes.
This is the freedom to be left alone by other people, especially the government. Berlin connects this view
with Locke, Tocqueville, Smith, Mill, and Constant. Mill and Constant are the focus of Berlin’s account of
negative liberty. The former held that this notion of liberty was “sacred” and the latter defended negative
liberty against it’s encroacher positive liberty. Berlin remarks that “adherents of the 'negative' notion [of
liberty] represent [positive liberty] as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal
tyranny.”94
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Positive liberty is the ability of an individual to determine one’s self. The philosophers that Berlin
associates with this tradition are Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Fichte. Berlin’s presentation suggests
that philosophers of positive liberty have seen an internal conflict between the rational and the passionate
within each individual. The satisfaction of positive liberty would be the domination of the passions by the
rational self: self-mastery.95 Two ways of reconciling the self are discussed by Berlin. These are selfabnegation, or limiting what one wills to what is attainable (Berlin addresses this in his section “The retreat
to the inner citadel”), and self-realization.
Berlin’s distinction of these central concepts of liberty and his subsequent analysis are useful and
informative. His discovery that Mill’s negative liberty does not preclude autocracy is particularly
poignant.96 His rejection of self-abnegation as liberty (another fault of Mill’s) is compelling.97 Nonetheless,
readers should be aware of Berlin’s problematic use of Rousseau which is unfair and misleading. Berlin
asserts things about positive liberty (of which Rousseau is said to be an author) that are not compatible
with Rousseau’s normative claims concerning government and the role of freedom in political theory.

Berlin’s Genealogy of Positive Liberty
Berlin first mentions Rousseau early in the essay and connects Rousseau directly with the legacy of
violence from the French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror”. Berlin acquaints the reader with the threat of
Rousseau, “...the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas:
philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilization. He spoke
of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the sword with which German deism had been decapitated, and
described the works of Rousseau as the blood-stained weapon which, in the hands of Robespierre, had
destroyed the old regime.”98 Berlin uses Heine to introduce both the danger of ideas and the specific
danger of Rousseau and Kant’s work (a theme which continues throughout the piece). Berlin recounts the
tradition of the philosophers of positive liberty, with Rousseau and Kant at first and Hegel (and the
disciples of Hegel) and Marx later. For Berlin, the common element for these philosophers is the belief that
freedom will be achieved through the conflict of two selves: one’s “empirical self” and the rationally
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enlightened self. The former being informed by one’s passions; the latter informed by reason. Berlin
explains that Rousseau and Kant developed ideologies that privileged this rationally enlightened self.
The rationally enlightened self recognizes one’s true interest while the “empirical self” would not.
The next step for advocates of positive liberty is self-realization. Self-realization is instituting reason as the
guiding principle of one’s will and the binding of the passions. Berlin credits Rousseau (with Kant and
Fichte) for recognizing that this doctrine of self-determined positive liberty could be applied on the societal
level as well as the individual level. Rousseau and others “...came at some point to ask themselves whether
a rational life not only for the individual, but also for society, was possible, and if so, how it was to be
achieved.”99 Berlin is referring here to Rousseau’s concept of the general will. Berlin does not use this term
in the paper at all, but he responds directly to Rousseau’s solution (from Book 1, ch. 6 “On the Social
Contract”): the way to substitute reason for passion on the societal level is the alienation of personal rights
through law. This is the submission of individuals to the general will. What Rousseau sees as the rationally
enlightened self-interest of all, is what Berlin sees as the brutal, often violent intrusion on negative liberty
and the equally dangerous marriage of autonomy and authority.
This doctrine was dangerous for Berlin because self-realization required the “empirical self” (of
individuals in society) to be made to accept what their rational selves would authorize, even over their
objections. The conception of freedom that Berlin attributes to the thinkers of positive liberty is the
freedom that requires individuals to be made to accept the forfeiture of property and the alienation of
their rights to the collective. Berlin explains the mechanism of coercion, “In due course, the thinkers who
bent their energies to the solution of the problem on these lines came to be faced with the question of
how in practice men were to be made rational in this way. Clearly they must be educated. For the
uneducated are irrational, heteronomous, and need to be coerced, if only to make life tolerable for the
rational if they are to live in the same society.”100 This is why positive freedom destroys negative freedom
for Berlin; the satisfaction of positive liberty necessitates the abridgement or corruption of negative
liberty.
The rationale behind this use of force (on Berlin’s interpretation of positive liberty) is a benevolent
paternalism. People must be made to do what they cannot recognize is in their best interest. Berlin notices
a difficulty for Kant on this point because it is coercive and disrespectful of autonomy (a crucial aspect of
Kant’s moral philosophy) to educate men in this way and make them obey laws of which they disapprove
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(based on their rational faculties).101 Nevertheless, Berlin presents aspects of both Rousseau’s and Kant’s
political works that license this form of benevolent despotism.
Berlin also explains that political philosophies based on rational self-determination should logically
all come to the same conclusions. He traces this sentiment back to ancient Greek rationalist political
philosophy. This search for rational self-direction should lead (per Comte, according to Berlin) to the
“correct way of life” and the “one true solution”.102 In Berlin’s conclusion and final pages he tends to make
even bolder claims which serve to further vilify positive liberty. Berlin states:
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the
great historical ideals - justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred
mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which demands the
sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or
in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of
history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. 103

Rousseau’s Concepts of Human Nature and Freedom
I find many reasons why Berlin’s notions of positive and negative liberty are not adequate to
describe Rousseau’s political philosophy. In the first place and as Berlin notes (with respect to Mill)
concepts of freedom are premised on concepts of human nature. Berlin makes no mention of Rousseau’s
famous account of the transition of humanity from the natural (or savage) state to civilized man as found
in “The Discourse on Inequality” (or “The Second Discourse”). Compared to Rousseau’s later works,
(“Discourse on Political Economy” and “On the Social Contract”) which are positive with respect to the
articulation of principles for good government, the Second Discourse is stark, harsh critique of political
society generally.
Part I of the Second Discourse describes the condition of man in the natural state, “in the first
Embryo of the species”104. This would be man as issued by nature and prior to the advancements of
government, law, cities, agriculture, metallurgy, property, music, dancing, homes, and families. Men and
women were solitary; children left mothers as soon as they were able and had no need of reunions. None
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of this would have been offensive to natural man because this “Savage man, deprived of every sort of
enlightenment, experiences only the Passions of this latter kind [those owing to the impulsion of nature];
his Desires do not exceed his Physical needs; The only goods he knows in the Universe are food, a female,
and rest; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger…”105 Conduct between humans is ignorant of morality
both good and evil, and is based largely on the aversion to suffering of one’s fellow humans.106 Part II of
“The Second Discourse” explains the developments that led to man’s irreversible and institutionalized
subjugation. Rousseau’s major claim is that the combination of man’s urge to be esteemed by others and
the ability to accrue wealth (initially in agricultural terms: land and cattle) beyond what is necessary for
survival created incentives to disregard the gentle attitudes they had held towards one another. Rousseau
explains the origin of property among the partially developed human race:
...In a word, so long as they applied themselves only to tasks a single individual could
perform and to arts that did not require the collaboration of several hands, they lived free, healthy,
good, and happy as far as they could by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentleness of
independent dealings with one another; as soon as it was found to be useful for one to have
provisions for two, equality disappeared, property appeared, work became necessary, and the vast
forests changed into smiling Fields that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where
slavery and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow together with the harvests.107
Rousseau envisions this to be one of the least pleasant eras in history. Acts of violence over property
would be prevalent as humanity “...debased and devastated, no longer able to turn back or renounce its
wretched acquisitions...brought itself to the brink of ruin”.108 This is the perilous condition that
necessitated the sacrifice of “natural freedom”. Political organization became a necessity for the
protection of life and property for all members of society, however its establishment favored the already
powerful (in terms of resources) over the weak. Rousseau on the danger and necessity of the new political
order: “...those most capable of anticipating the abuses were precisely those who counted on profiting
from them, and even the wise saw that they had to make up their mind to sacrifice one part of their
freedom to preserve the other, as a wounded man has his arm cut off to save the rest of His Body.” 109 This
bargain for protection (natural freedom exchanged for political or civil freedom) must be a limitation for
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positive freedom. Positive freedom in the total sense is not an option for Rousseau once political society
and its precursors (property, accumulation) exist. Yet, the republican theme of protection of life and
property continues throughout Rousseau’s work and is the essential preoccupation of legitimate
government in “The Third Discourse”.

Rousseau against Berlin’s Rousseau
Berlin identified the general will in Rousseau as an expression of positive liberty and positive liberty
as something which justifies brutal tyranny, the education of men as to their best interest over their
objections, and which can authorize the “sacrifice” of men. Conversely, Rousseau speaks clearly that the
general will is a limit on both “civil freedom”110 and the ends of government111 (which consist mainly in
good management of communal resources, effective legislation towards mutual interest, and the
minimization of corruption intrinsic to the political society). More, for Rousseau the sacrifice of even one
innocent to an oppressive government warrants immediate dissolution of that government.
A main difference between Berlin’s positive liberty and Rousseau’s general will is the purpose of
each conceptual tool. Berlin depicts a set of ideological objectives that correspond to a utopian end to
political conflict while Rousseau’s general will is an expression of those particular political objectives which
most preserve the citizen’s ability to live and prosper, despite the inherent inequality of the continuing
political project. Berlin’s positive freedom can legitimate any set of objectives deemed “rational” (including
violence) but general will can legitimate only that which protects property and harms none of the citizens.
Even criminals (traitors against society) who might be killed for the purposes of deterrence are to be
spared if practicable.112 Chiefs, magistrates, legislators, citizens should be able to understand their
interests as individuals, the interests or “particular will” of the group to which they belong (as priests or
soldiers), and the interests of the group as a whole. Deliberation on the general will and the other wills is
an activity that Rousseau expects the members of a society should engage in. Rousseau’s general will is not
as static or necessarily state-affirming as Berlin’s presentation of it.
Rousseau discusses general will in “On the Social Contract”, but it is introduced in the “Third
Discourse”. Rousseau’s second rule for government in the “Third Discourse” discretely addresses the
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education of citizens toward the dictates of general will. At first glance it may seem that Berlin’s claim
about the forced conformity of all to the general will (as an expression of positive liberty) holds water.
Rousseau states: “[The] Second essential rule of public economy, no less important than the first. Do you
wish the general will to be carried out? See to it that all particular wills take their bearings by it; and since
virtue is nothing but the conformity of the particular will to the general will, to say the same thing in a
word, make virtue reign.”113 Soon after, Rousseau continues with the mechanism of this conformity, “It is
not enough to tell the citizens, be good; they have to be taught to do so;...and love of fatherland is most
effective...”114 However, Rousseau is not the supporter of tyranny that Berlin has presented him as. The
success of encouraging people to love the Fatherland is contingent on the fatherland being worthy of their
love. If the fatherland did not protect civil security, “...the word fatherland could only have an odious or a
ridiculous meaning for them.”115
Berlin did not offer readers a portrayal of the Rousseau’s radical opposition to tyranny. Rousseau is
radical because he advocates immediate dissolution of tyrannical/despotic regimes. Contrary to Berlin,
Rousseau gives a full-throated defense of the protection of citizens from the injustice of despots:
Private safety is so closely bound up with the public confederation that, if it were not for
the concessions that have to be made to human weakness, this convention would be by right be
dissolved if a single citizen in the state perish who could have been saved; if a single one were
wrongfully kept in jail, and if a single lawsuit were lost through a manifest injustice: for once the
fundamental conventions have been violated, it is no longer clear what right or interest could
maintain the people in the social union, lest it be retained in it by sheer force, which makes for the
dissolution of the civil state.116
This fiery condemnation of despotism and tyranny is a further illustration of why Rousseau and Berlin’s
Rousseau do not match up.

Why would Berlin do this?
There are at least three potential explanations for Berlin having presented Rousseau this way.
Solution 1: Berlin was a careless scholar. I find this to be least likely of my solutions, however his reading of
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Rousseau’s general will emphasizes what is found in “On the Social Contract” while neglecting entirely
Rousseau’s introduction and explanation of general will in “Discourse on Political Economy”. Solution 2:
The sheer breadth of work discussed in “Two Concepts of Liberty” required the abridgement of important
aspects of Rousseau’s work and precluded a nuanced presentation. Berlin does not present an
evenhanded or nuanced reading of Rousseau because he was not able to. This explanation is more
plausible than the first, but perhaps more damning as Berlin’s renditions of other thinkers would now also
potentially be in question. Solution 3: Berlin purposely misrepresented Rousseau and other advocates of
“positive liberty” due to his anti-Marxist political biases. Berlin, as a political opponent of Communist
ideologies, may have wanted to impugn an entire branch of philosophical thinkers and Rousseau was on
that branch. A combination of reasons 2 and 3 is the most likely explanation. Berlin’s remarks in a 1998
interview substantiate my speculation. In the interview, Berlin agrees with interviewer Steven Lukes that
“Two Concepts of Liberty” is not neutral conceptual analysis, but rather carries a powerful “anti-Marxist”
political message.117 On the whole, Berlin does readers of “Two Concepts of Liberty” who do not
encounter Rousseau’s work elsewhere a disservice and offers a prejudicial interpretation to those who
have.
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